Against neo-wittgensteinian entitlements

In this paper I raise some worries against one specific notion of entitlement defended in the last decade mainly by Crispin Wright (but also, in some ways, by Michael Williams). As first proposed, entitlements should be novel kinds of warrant, hereto unknown to epistemological reflection and capable of solving the old and most challenging problem of epistemology—that is, scepticism of both a Cartesian and of a Humean fashion. Furthermore, the notion of entitlement here under consideration is taken to be of Wittgensteinian descent—or so it is argued by its supporters. It would therefore usefully lend itself to an interpretation of Wittgenstein’s ideas in On Certainty. In the first part of the paper, I briefly present Wright’s views. In the second, I show why entitlements cannot be appealed to in the course of a fair rendition of Wittgenstein’s ideas. In the third, I show why, irrespective of their alleged Wittgensteinian lineage, entitlements are highly problematic in their own right

Strange bedfellows: on Pritchard’s disjunctivist hinge epistemology

The paper discusses some themes in Duncan Pritchard’s last book, Epistemic Angst. Radical Skepticism and the Groundlessness of Our Believing. It considers it in relation to other forms of Wittgenstein-inspired hinge-epistemology. It focuses, in particular, on the proposed treatment of Closure in relation to entailments containing hinges, the treatment of Underdetermination-based skeptical paradox and the avail to disjunctivism to respond to the latter. It argues that, although bold and thought-provoking, the mix of hinge epistemology and disjunctivism Pritchard proposes is not motivated

What Do Philosophers Do? Maddy, Moore and Wittgenstein

The paper discusses and presents an alternative interpretation to Penelope Maddy’s reading of G.E. Moore’s and Ludwig Wittgenstein’s anti-skeptical strategies as proposed in her book What Do Philosophers Do? Skepticism and the Practice of Philosophy. It connects this discussion with the methodological claims Maddy puts forward and offers an alternative to her therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein’s On Certainty

What anti-realism about hinges could possibly be?

The paper addresses the issue of what epistemic anti-realism could possibly be, in the context of “hinge epistemology.” According to this new epistemological trend, justification depends on evidence together with general background assumptions—for example, that there is an external world, that our sense organs are mostly reliable, that we are not the victims of persistent and lucid dreams what has regularly happened in the past will happen in the future, that people are generally reliable informants, and so on. The paper then addresses two issues. First, whether these assumptions are arbitrary, as relativists would claim. Second, how we should conceive of their metaphysical status. It responds negatively to the first question and puts forward an anti-realist conception of hinges to respond to the latter. Central to the proposal is that the kind of truth that can be predicated of hinges is of a minimalist kind. The paper also explores the compatibility of minimalism about hinges' truth and alethic pluralism

Précis

The paper is a précis of my The Varieties of Self-Knowledge (Palgrave, 2016

[18F](2S,4R)-4-Fluoroglutamine as a New Positron Emission Tomography Tracer in Myeloma

The high glycolytic activity of multiple myeloma (MM) cells is the rationale for use of Positron Emission Tomography (PET) with 18F-fluorodeoxyglucose ([18F]FDG) to detect both bone marrow (BM) and extramedullary disease. However, new tracers are actively searched because [18F]FDG-PET has some limitations and there is a portion of MM patients who are negative. Glutamine (Gln) addiction has been recently described as a typical metabolic feature of MM cells. Yet, the possible exploitation of Gln as a PET tracer in MM has never been assessed so far and is investigated in this study in preclinical models. Firstly, we have synthesized enantiopure (2S,4R)-4-fluoroglutamine (4-FGln) and validated it as a Gln transport analogue in human MM cell lines, comparing its uptake with that of 3H-labelled Gln. We then radiosynthesized [18F]4-FGln, tested its uptake in two different in vivo murine MM models, and checked the effect of Bortezomib, a proteasome inhibitor currently used in the treatment of MM. Both [18F]4-FGln and [18F]FDG clearly identified the spleen as site of MM cell colonization in C57BL/6 mice, challenged with syngeneic Vk12598 cells and assessed by PET. NOD.SCID mice, subcutaneously injected with human MM JJN3 cells, showed high values of both [18F]4-FGln and [18F]FDG uptake. Bortezomib significantly reduced the uptake of both radiopharmaceuticals in comparison with vehicle at post treatment PET. However, a reduction of glutaminolytic, but not of glycolytic, tumor volume was evident in mice showing the highest response to Bortezomib. Our data indicate that [18F](2S,4R)-4-FGln is a new PET tracer in preclinical MM models, yielding a rationale to design studies in MM patients

Wittgensteinian Anti-Scepticism and Epistemic Vertigo

status: publishe

Dialetheism in Action: A New Strategy for Solving the Equal Validity Paradox

This paper starts from the Equal Validity Paradox, a paradoxical argument connected to the so-called phenomenon of faultless disagreement. It is argued that there are at least six strategies for solving the paradox. After presenting the first five strategies and their main problems, the paper focuses on the sixth strategy which rejects the assumption that every proposition cannot be both true a false. Dialetheism is the natural candidate for developing strategy six. After presenting strategy six in detail, we formulate a normative problem for the dialetheist and offer a tentative solution to it. We then elaborate further considerations connecting strategy six to pluralism about truth and logic. Even if strategy six is a hard path to take, its scrutiny highlights some important points on truth, logic and the norms for acceptance and rejection